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Abstract 
In many of his papers the contemporary and much debated author Hubert Dreyfus resorts to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “motor 
intentionality” in order to uphold the view of direct relation, not mediated by mental representations, between subject and world. 
He claims that as a person becomes an expert in a domain (driving, playing piano etc.), she does not respond in a rule-like way to 
objects, but in a flexible way to situations as wholes. No representations of objects or rules are active anymore; the whole 
situation in which that person is immersed requires her to act in a certain way. However, skillful coping, although not guided by 
rules, is not automatic action; it is intentional behavior, viz. motor intentionality – the body’s adaptation to the environmental 
“solicitations”. This paper challenges this thesis by arguing that, in order to account for skillful coping, one need to explain how 
the body succeeds in dealing with complicated objects that require multiple object tracking, specific timing and spatiotemporal 
coordination of movements. Using contemporary research findings, it could be argued that such coping needs binding of many 
kinds of information (about object features, spatial details and motor commands) in the same mental file. After clarifying the 
concept of “mental representation”, the paper argues that such files are subpersonal representations for action. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade in philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences the role of bodily abilities grows increasingly in 
importance in what regards explaining core features of the mind (cf. embodied mind theory, enactive approach, 
autonomous robotics etc.). This tendency meets and develops ideas of the continental phenomenological tradition, 
such as the constitutive role of the body in perception (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty), or the importance of the concept of 
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“readiness-to-hand” (Heidegger) for understanding basic coping with objects etc. For example, Dreyfus (2008) 
considers that the new artificial intelligence will either be Heideggerian, or it will be nothing at all. Wheeler (2005) 
resorts to Heideggerian concepts, such as presence-at-hand and ready-to-hand, in order to criticize the Cartesian 
assumptions of the classic computationalism. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) invoke Merlau-Ponty’s approach 
to perception for explaining the role of the sensorimotor coupling in perception and for rejecting the concept of 
mental representation. There is no concrete development of Husserl's ideas, but there are authors arguing that the 
phenomenological ideas making nowadays career in philosophy of mind (ex., the role of the body) are already to be 
found in Husserl’s work (see Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, esp. p. 134 ff.). 
A major tenet of this tendency is the new account of action as dynamic cooperation among brain, body and 
environment, thus questioning the classic linear perception-reasoning-action account. The basic explanatory tool of 
the new approach is the theory of dynamic systems which uses concepts as topological evolutions in state space, 
order variables, control parameters, attractors etc. to explain mind as a dynamic system (cf. Kelso, 1995; van Gelder, 
1997; Beer, 2000 etc.). A dynamic system „is a set of quantitative variables changing continually, concurrently, and 
interdependently over quantitative time in accordance with dynamical laws described by some set of equations.” 
(Wilson & Keil, 1999, p. 245). According to the classic theory of cognition, the intelligent actions are mediated by 
mental representations. During perception, after the physical input stimulates the sensorial interface of the cognitive 
system, the visual cortex computes this input in order to produce a representation compatible with the symbolic 
representations of the central cognitive modules (for ex., searching for solutions and action planning). After an 
action plan is generated, the output, i.e., the motor command, achieves this plan. Cf., for example, (Marr, 1982, p. 
23; Fodor, 1987, p. 102-103; Pylyshyn 2003, ch. 2). Perception and action are directly connected to each other; they 
are, actually, identical (Noë, 2004). Perception is seen as a kind of bodily skillful ability. One has to move his body, 
hands, the eyes etc. to get the best grip on objects. In Noë’s words: “Perception is not something that happens to us, 
or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a cluttered space, 
perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at 
least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is.” (2004, p. 1). 
Action directly connected to perception (named online action – action generated as smooth response to the 
ongoing sensorial input) does not need representational mediation because the environment is its own model of 
action (Brooks, 1991). In contrast, offline actions are executed when the agent is not connected to the ongoing 
sensorial stimuli (for ex., planning to buy a computer, imagining counterfactuals etc.). Cf. (Clark & Toribio, 1994). 
It requires a highly sensitive mechanism to detect stimuli and a capacity of adjusting in real time the behavior in 
accordance with the continuously changing world. Beside high sensitivity, online action requires attunement to the 
world’s details. To translate it phenomenologically, the agent able of skilled online action is familiar with the world. 
Perception is for action (ecological psychology), and action must be performed in real time. Only those animals 
familiar with their niche are able to perceive quickly and adjust their behavior accordingly. This familiarity is 
manifest at the level of bodily skills, not as mental representational faculty. This paper discusses Dreyfus’ 
nonrepresentational account on skillful coping that resorts to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “motor intentionality”.  
2. Skillful action and motor intentionality 
By skillful action it is understood the ability of smoothly and efficiently coping in real time with environmental 
challenges. How does the agent manage to act successfully in a world of disparate details? How do past experiences 
with similar situations work in current interactions? Do they really work non-representationally? Dreyfus (2005) 
draws on Merleau-Ponty’s critique against intellectualist and empiricist accounts of action for arguing that any 
representational account leads to circularity. To act in a situation, the agent should understand that situation, but, in 
order to understand it, he needs to apply past experiences stored in form of representations to the current situation. 
But, be it a deductive process (the intellectualist), or an inductive one (the empiricist), in both cases the problem of 
how to apply mental representations to new situations pops up. How does the agent know which representation to 
apply, given that there are no two absolutely identical situations? The situations resemble in certain respects, and not 
in others. To identify which features of the current situation match a certain stored representation, the agent should 
already have understood the current situation (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 130; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 15).  
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The problem of applicability of mental representations in new contexts is not per se a problem of the 
representational accounts of skillful action, because, if it were a problem, then any kind of action based on mental 
planning should be impossible. But we can act on mental representations; we can apply them in new contexts. When 
I walk in the evening on a dark empty street and I see something resembling a dog, I decide to turn back; I apply a 
pre-existing representation of a similar situation when I was bitten by a dog. I may discover that that something is a 
big cat, but the representation is nevertheless regulating my action. What is more important in Dreyfus’ critique is 
that representational mediation means reasoning that takes time (identifying the relevant features of the current 
situation, matching to the appropriate representation, and building the action plan). It is obvious that, when I see that 
shape resembling a dog, I just act very quickly, without thinking on the relevant features of the current situation and 
without consciously building an action plan.  
But how can we act quickly, and at the same time rely on previous experiences? According to Dreyfus, rule- and 
representation-following is specific to the novice who learns a behavior, but it disappears when he becomes an 
expert. Dreyfus describes in many papers how this shift takes place (Dreyfus, 2002a; 2005; 2009; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986). First, the agent passes from the detached rule-following stance to that of emotional involvement. He 
invokes Merleau-Ponty’s (1962, pp. 94 ff.) example of a person (Schneider) who lacked the faculty of emotions and 
because of this he cannot learn new skills; he acted always on rules, like a robot. See (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 131). The 
agent tries to improve his behavior in accordance with the rules enjoying his successes and trying to avoid failures. 
Each positive experience will strengthen the connection between that action and the successful response and each 
negative experience will lead to the inhibition of the unsuccessful responses. Gradually, with emotional 
involvement, rules are replaced by “situations discriminations accompanied by associated responses.” (2002a, p. 
370). Between agent and world a feedback loop is emerging: as the successful interactions with a situation are 
repeated, the situation increasingly appears as a space of possibilities for action, the agent becoming able to give 
increasingly better answers: “The notion of a dialectic of milieu and action is meant to capture the idea that, in 
learning, past experience is projected back into the perceptual world of the learner and shows up as affordances or 
solicitations to further action. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, a “person’s projects polarize the world, bringing magically 
to view a host of signs which guide action, as notices in a museum guide the visitor” (PP 130/112/129).” (Dreyfus, 
2005, p. 132). 
This dialectics is described by Dreyfus with another concept of Merleau-Ponty, namely intentional arc. 
Intentional arc differs from reflex arc in that that the action underpinned by it is not conceived as application of 
mental representations in non-mental contexts. Reflex arc refers to the neural mechanism underlying reflex 
(automatic) actions. In this context it refers to the linear account of action in which the physical stimulus is 
converted in mental representation and then the message of cognitive processing is converted in motor command. 
(Spivey, 2007, p. 9-10). The world is already meaningful for the skilled agent; it appears as a space of possibilities 
for action. This is possible because intelligent action belongs to an embodied being. Only for an embodied being 
objects appear as placed far or near, back or in front, to the right or to the left etc., generating specific affordances 
for action (Gibson, 1986). Since Gibson affordances are understood as possibilities for action. A chair affords 
sitting, a door entering etc. They are specified at the intersection between the world’s invariants and the agent’s 
abilities of detecting them. (Gibson, 1986, p. 127-128). Due to his body and embeddedness in the world the agent is 
able to detect affordances and act accordingly. Affordances, according to Gibson, are entirely given in perception. 
There is no need to ascribe meaning to meaningless stimuli; already in perception things appear as having meaning, 
namely, the meaning of afforded actions. 
Dreyfus attempts to explain how things reveal in perception their meaning for action by means of the intentional 
arc: previous experiences are not stored as distinct representations, to be activated in similar situations; they tune the 
sensorimotor abilities to make finer and finer discriminations and to respond adequately to these discriminations. 
Past experiences carve the body, its sensorial and motor abilities, to respond increasingly better to affordances. This 
is what Merleau-Ponty would call motor intentionality: although the skilled action is not guided by rules and 
representations, it is not an automatically executed one; it is intentional action, viz. the body’s adaptation to the 
environmental “solicitations”.  
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3. What are mental representations? 
Before judging whether skillful coping is supported by mental representations, it is necessary to clarify what does 
mental representation exactly mean. This can be usually done by identifying the necessary conditions a state must 
fulfill in order to be considered mental representation. First of all, a mental representation is a state or process in 
relation with an object, event or state of affairs. For example, the mental representation MOON is in relation with 
the moon. The uppercase words name mental representations in order to differentiate them from their names (noted 
in quotes) and their referents. This relationship, accepting the Fregean tradition, is a referential one. MOON is about 
the moon, it refers to it.  
But what makes referentiality differ from a simple causal relation? My stomach pain is in relation with the food I 
have ingested last night, but it is still not a representation of what I have eaten. I can explain my pain as a simple 
causal effect of the food I have eaten. Therefore, the referential relation is more than a simple causal relation. We 
cannot however affirm that it is different from the causal relation, because it would render it as magic property, 
independent from the physical world (Fodor, 1987).  
The majority of authors consider that mental representations are physical states playing certain functional roles. 
MOON is a representation because it is an argument in a cognitive function (to think about the moon, to make a plan 
to plant astronomical observatory on the moon’s surface etc.). The stomach pain does not stay as argument in 
organic functions of referring to the ingested food. It can be simply explained as a causal effect of food.  
Functional roles are usually understood as causal relations achieving a certain task or goal. Artifacts play 
functional roles in that they achieve the task they are designed to achieve. In the case of natural entities, this 
meaning of functionalization leads to antropomorphization. For our purposes, functionalization can be understood in 
its mathematical neutral meaning (Vosgerau, 2009, p. 44-5), as something that maps the current state (Si ) of the 
device and input (I) to subsequent state (Si+1) and output (O).  
fIO: (I, Si) → (O, Si+1).   
Therefore, a representation is a state that can be argument in a mathematical function. For example, a beaver flees 
when it hears the splash of the tail of another beaver in water (what for it means that a predator is approaching). The 
corresponding function is: fBF: (beaver at x, splash of the tail near x) → beaver at y. The argument “splash of the 
tail near x“ stands for danger in the function fBF. 
However, the functional role is not enough for distinguishing referential relations from bare causal ones. For 
example, if I plant a tree with the goal of having more shadow in my house in the afternoon, though the shadow has 
a functional role, it is not a representation (Ramsey, 2007, p. 136). It would be a representation if it were used in a 
sundial to indicate the day time (Ibidem). But in this latter situation, the shadow is functionalized not due to its 
physical qualities (of producing coolness in my house), but because it stands for something else; it is used by the 
sundial due to its referential property of standing for the day time. It is to note that the sundial uses the shadow not 
exclusively for its physical qualities, but because the position of the shadow is arbitrarily associated with certain 
values. That is why Wheeler (2005, p. 221) argues that representations must have the quality of arbitrariness, which 
means that their functional role “is fixed not by any non-informational physical properties of those elements (say 
their shape or weight), but by their capacity, when organized and exploited in the right ways, to carry specific items 
or bodies of information.”  
Wheeler states also the homuncularity condition – representations are possible only in systems 
compartmentalized into a set of subsystems that communicate with each other by means of representations (2001, p. 
221). This condition is implicitly met by the functionality condition because a representation exerts its role only in 
virtue of its being “consumed” by another module of the cognitive system. 
MOON plays its representational role in the cognitive system due to its quality of standing for the moon, not of 
its qualities related to its physical implementation. The physical qualities mediate the realization of the functional 
role, but are not identical with that role. Functions are multiple realizable. The function of money to mediate 
commercial exchanges can be realized by papers, metals, or even by electronic circuits in the computers of the 
Central Bank. For the argument of multiple realizations applied to mental states see (Fodor, 1995; Putnam, 1975; 
Pylyshyn, 1984). 
Therefore, there are three minimal conditions a state must fulfill in order to be considered representation: 
referentiality, functionality and arbitrariness. There is another condition invoked especially by those who aim at 
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eliminating the concept of mental representation from the scientific explanations, namely decouplability (Gallagher, 
2008, see a response to Gallagher in Wheeler, 2008) – the condition that mental representations should be decoupled 
from the sensorimotor flux. This condition actually reiterates the idea that representations stand only for absent 
objects (cf. Haugeland, 1998, p. 172).  By this condition, Gallagher wants to reject the notion of mental 
representation, saying that mental representations as decoupled states are useless for the online action, because they 
should be connected to the online flux to be effective, and as coupled to the sensorimotor flux they are not actually 
representations, because they should stand for something absent and serve as input for a cognitive function, but all 
the mechanisms underlying online action are directly connected to each other and to the world, so that they need not 
representations for absent stimuli. The present paper argues in section 5 in favor of representations for action, that is, 
of representations coupled to the sensorimotor flux.  
4. Motor intentionality and the holist argument 
Coming back to skillful coping, this is for Dreyfus a non-representational ability based on motor intentionality, as 
we have seen in section 2. Until now we have discussed only the phenomenological argument in favor of motor 
intentionality. One can reply that phenomenology can grasp only the conscious mental phenomena, and that it 
cannot capture the subpersonal processes (Anthony 2002). Dreyfus thinks it is not necessary to postulate 
subpersonal representations to explain skillful coping. He resorts also to empirical arguments to uphold his thesis. 
One of them refers to artificial neural networks.  
An artificial neural (or connectionist) network is an intelligent device comprising a huge number of simple 
interconnected units that work according to the principle of spreading activation (propagation of the activation 
throughout the whole network according to a numerical formula). The network achieves cognitive properties by 
activating a set of units distributed throughout the whole network. Connectionist networks prove to be successful in 
adaptation to new situations, learning from mistakes, construction of its own algorithms etc. They are constructed on 
the principle of recurrent adaptation, formation of its own algorithms of dealing with stimulus information starting 
from a very sparse basis of general principles.  
For example, a network can learn to recognize words by category (verbs, nouns etc.) and reproduce them 
phonetically in English. In the training phase the network is confronted with many linguistic samples and trained to 
recognize them starting from general categories. After each training phase, the network adjusts its weights (back-
propagation) in order to produce output closer to the desired output. When training is finished, the network is able to 
recognize new words that were not presented in the training phase. Actually, the network “learns from experience”; 
it is able to do its job due to its ability to form its own algorithm just on the basis of correction and back-
propagation. Cf., for example, Sejnowski and Rosenberg’s (1987) NETtalk – a network that can read English texts; 
Rumelhart and McClelland’s (1986) network that can predict past tense. 
Dreyfus (2005) takes connectionist networks as empirical evidence for motor intentionality. Such networks 
operate dynamically and holistically; each new experience propagates throughout the whole network and, if it 
reaches a certain threshold, it reconfigures the network’s activation patterns. Also, each new experience is 
determined by the current layout of the network shaped by previous experiences. Thus, past experiences are not 
stored as distinct memories; they modify the weights between the units, so that the network can better cope with new 
situations of the same type.  
Although it is not possible to find distinct representations in connectionist networks corresponding to external 
objects at the level of physical units because of the distributed character, which means that the same units are 
involved in encoding different cognitive processes, however, vectors of the neural activations stand out as distinct 
functional entities at the abstract mathematical level. Their numerical formulas, which guide their activations and 
connections with other vectors, may be considered non-classical ways of encoding the input and output, according to 
Smolensky’s Tensorial Product Representation Theory (1995, p. 237 ff.). When we think about the letter A, a 
specific vector is activated, that is different from the one activated when thinking about the letter B. The vector 
systematically co-varies with the letter, though it is not stored as a physical unit, but as pattern of activation; and this 
systematic co-variation should be enough for stating a representational relation between internal states and external 
stimuli (Jackson, 2002, p. 409-410). 
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Dreyfus (2002b, p. 420) claims that such correlations are too weak to account for a representational relation. The 
activations comprise so intricate influences from different brain areas (perception, recognition, action etc.), that it is 
difficult to say that there are brain states representing external objects. Dreyfus invokes in many places Freeman’s 
neural theory and findings. By studying the neurobiology of rabbit’s olfactory system, Freeman has remarked the 
phenomenon of variance of the neural patterns in the olfactory bulb (the so called AM – amplitude modulation 
patterns), in situations in which the stimuli were the same. If the classic approach were true (that is, the internal 
states are copies of external stimuli), the AM patterns should co-vary with the stimuli. But the AM patterns variation 
depends on context, history and significance. Significance stands here for the fact that the stimuli are associated with 
reward or punishment (2000, p. 77). The AM patterns are not imposed from without; they emerge from the self-
organizing activity of the brain at the impact of different perturbations. Dreyfus, commenting on this, suggests that 
the rabbit’s state responsible for looking after food is not grounded in a representation of a carrot, but is the sum of 
all past experiences of acting with carrots (sniffing, eating etc.) (Dreyfus, 2008, p. 351). Thus, past experiences are 
stored not as objective representations, but encode concrete experiences of acting and responding. 
But the argument of holist character of brain activations constitutes an opportunity to rethink the concept of 
representation rather than of rejecting it. According to Spivey (2007), neural activations are probabilistic states with 
fuzzy margins. They are trajectories in a dynamic system (see note 5), realized by distributed activations of a set 
(population) of neurons. The population of neurons encoding all the features of the external object is never 
completely activated. Because of this, there are no well-delimited neural states corresponding to external things; 
there are no two identical activations corresponding to the same object. They always varies depending on context, 
bodily states etc. For example, in Spivey plastic words, the current thought about Grandma could be conceived as 
“0.8 Grandma, 0.02 Kathryn Hepburn, 0.01 Mother Teresa, and hundreds of other representations with very low 
confidence, that together add up to 1.0, then we begin to see how the mind is indeed like Schrödinger’s cat: in 
multiple identifiable states at once.” (2008, p. 13). So, the thought about Grandma is not a discrete symbol; it is a 
partial activation of the neural population; a temporary stabilization in the continuous flux of overlapping 
activations.  
Nevertheless, we have the impression of entertaining well-delimited thoughts. At least, we succeed to refer to 
Grandma, not to many persons simultaneously. How is this possible, given the continuous and overlapping 
activations of the brain states? Spivey calls this self-delusion, the illusion of believing that we can entertain well-
delimited thoughts (2007, p. 34). But this phenomenon of self-delusion does not mean, however, that there are no 
neural states corresponding to the external things, but only that these states are partial and probabilistic. The fact that 
the brain deludes itself means that “We have these tendencies because without these overidealized categorical 
separations and discrete labels, we feel at a loss for how to talk about these phenomena.” (2007, p. 28). In Dietrich 
& Markman (2003) an argumentation that the brain must operate with discrete states. In another place, Spivey 
suggests that the fuzzy probabilistic states turn themselves into discrete states during the transition from motor 
planning to motor command (Ibidem, p. 3). The body’s effectors (limbs, eyes, hands, mouth etc.) can accomplish 
only one thing at a time; this fact of embodiment determines the amalgamated trajectory “to warp itself over time 
toward largely approximating only one mental state just long enough to produce that mental state’s associated 
action.” (Ibidem, p. 14). It is a fact specific to the embodied mind highlighted by Spivey that the action contributes 
to the individuation of the mental state underlying that action, questioning thus the classic linear account in which 
only the mental state determines the identity of the action. Nevertheless, the non-linear relation between different 
brain areas, their holistic cooperation, does not exclude the existence of (partially) discrete mental states that co-vary 
with the external objects. 
5. Skills and the lack of representations 
This section addresses the question whether skillful action is based on representations or not. As we have seen, 
describing the phases of skill acquisition, Dreyfus concludes that experts do not need representations of any kind, 
neither of objects and their spatial embeddedness, nor of the movements necessary to achieve the action in that 
context. He claims that an expert does not respond to objects in a rule-like way, but in a flexible way to situations as 
wholes. For example, for the expert driver the whole situation, comprising the driver herself, the car and the street, 
requires her to act in a certain way. A curve requires her to brake, but she does not represent a rule as when to brake; 
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she does not even need a representation of the brake pedal (2002b, p. 419). In such cases the driver is so deeply 
immersed in that situation that there is no subject-object gap; there is no representation of distinct objects, because 
for the driver there are no distinct objects; there are only situations affording actions, or, as Merleau-Ponty would 
say, fields of forces enabling or preventing actions. Dreyfus could resort to Milner and Goodale’s empirical 
distinction between vision-for-perception (supported by the ventral stream) and vision-for-action (supported by the 
dorsal stream) to argue that online action operates independently of object identification. He mentions cases of 
patients suffering of apperceptive agnosia who cannot identify and recognize visually presented objects, though they 
are still able to perform visually guided actions upon them. Vision-for-perception deals with identification and 
recognition of objects. Vision-for-action detects online information to be used for guiding action (Milner & 
Goodale, 1995). 
But how does the body succeed without representations in coping with so different and complicated objects as 
cars, brakes etc.? Working with instruments cannot be limited to the direct online adaptation of the hand shape to the 
shape of the instrument. Literature on affordances stresses chiefly the role of intrinsic body properties (for ex. the 
body size) and of innate or acquired bodily capacities (for ex., to run, to catch etc.) in determining affordances (cf. 
17). But there are also situations in which actions are initiated due to the knowledge about objects (for ex., what is a 
bike). See (Borghi, 2005). Some instruments require simultaneous tracking of different aspects of the instrument and 
the execution of multiple movements in a certain order and timing. Jacob and Jeannerod distinguish within the 
vision-for-action module between low-level and high-level motor processing. Patients suffering of apraxia are not 
able to appropriately use instruments, or to mimic their use, though they can perform simple movements, such as 
grasping and moving objects (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Jeannerod, 2006). In their view, patients suffering of 
apraxia lack the ability for building representations for action; they lack the recipe encoding the spatiotemporal 
coordination of their movements in accordance with the properties of the instruments. These representations for 
action are localized in the left inferior parietal cortex (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003, p. 253). It is possible that, in the 
process of gaining skills, the initial explicit representations of objects and rules are molded into subpersonal 
representations for action.  
The distinction personal/subpersonal does not amount here to a distinction between mental/non-mental (Hurley, 
1998), but to a distinction between conscious/subconscious, not in a Freudian sense, but in Stich’s (1978) 
doxastic/sub-doxastic distinction (cf. the discussion in Drayson, 2012). There are cognitive processes, like 
perceiving an object that are consciously executed, and other processes, like the conversion of light in information 
about edges, of which we are not aware. According to Drayson, the personal-level explanation does not stipulate per 
se the existence of specific personal-level processes or states; it refers to abstract states (desires, beliefs etc.) and it is 
compatible with many cognitive explanations. If we accept the dominant functionalist/computationalist explanation 
of cognitive explanation, it follows that, there are cognitive functions we are aware of and others we are not aware 
of (Drayson, 2012). Therefore, the domain of the mental is not defined by the personal level, because the personal 
level consists basically of the same functions as the subpersonal level. It is neither defined as the domain of the 
conscious because what we call subconscious processes are basically the same computational processes as the 
conscious ones. The domain of the mental should be defined in relation with the nature of cognitive processes 
supporting it. But this definition exceeds the aim of this paper. 
Representations for action are those representations that underpin action fulfillment. They are differentiated from 
those involved in object and rule identification in that, according to Millikan, they do not emerge from putting 
together the descriptive and directive content via practical reasoning. The representations for action directly connect 
the descriptive and directive information (1995, 186). Clark (1997), Wheeler and Clark (1999), Wheeler (2005) have 
defended the concept of action-oriented representation as referring to action-specific, egocentric and context-
dependent representations. Their content is not an objective recipe of action steps, but a contextualization of it 
during learning depending on the task at hand, the body capabilities, and environmental conditions. A person learns 
playing football by explicitly following a set of rules. But, as she is becoming expert player, her skills are 
determined by whether she is training herself on natural or artificial grass, in a small or normal team, the amount of 
time dedicated to training etc. RAs result precisely from the harmonization of these multiple factors. 
This thesis may gain empirical support from the theory of event coding. Hommel and colleagues have argued 
that, during action preparation, stimulus information and behavioral responses to it are encoded in the same neuro-
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functional location, i.e., in the same event file. They develop the theory of object files of Kahneman, Treisman and 
Gibbs (1992). Object files are neuro-functional entities that encode temporarily different kinds of information about 
an object in the same memory location. This theory is meant to solve the binding problem – how it is the experience 
of unitary objects, given that the sensorial information is registered in different brain areas.Experiments show that, if 
I decide to grab a target and, in completing my action, a disturbing factor interferes, the more the disturbing factor 
physically resembles the action target, the less probably is that I will perceive it. For example, I notice a right 
pointing arrow in front of me and I decide to grab it and, while I am executing the movement, another arrow is 
introduced in my visual field. It is less probably that I will perceive the new introduced arrow before completing the 
intended movement if it is a right pointing arrow than if it is a left pointing arrow. The hypothesis is that the 
detection of the disturbing object is impaired because the corresponding neural encoding of that feature type is 
temporarily bound in another event file, making difficult the simultaneous emergence of two event files integrating 
the same feature type (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Hommel, 1998, 2004). Hence, event files underpinning action 
are neuro-functional entities that temporarily bind sensorial and motor information in the same memory location. 
These files integrate temporarily the sensorial and response information relevant for an action and constitute the 
basis for subsequent online updating of that action with new information generated in the course of action. This is 
also the basis for fixating the action in long-term memory.  
The concept of representations for action as event file matches the definition of representations sketched in 
section 3. They encode sensorial and motor information relative to an action (referentiality). They stand as inputs to 
the motor module (functionality). In what regards arbitrariness, an event file is not a causal propagation of the 
sensorimotor flux; it contains a certain mapping of stimulus feature to motor command. It is this mapping in virtue 
of which the file is processed by the motor module. 
Therefore, when a situation affords an action, it is because a feature of that situation (and not others) is associated 
with a motor response in a representation for action. For example, the novice driver learns that a certain sign means 
dangerous curve. He represents what this sign means (to slow down the speed) and achieves the required action by 
representing, among other, the brake pedal, the curve, the steering wheel etc. For the expert, the sign triggers 
directly the action of braking, without any representation of speed, brake pedal etc. Following the meaning of 
representations for action sketched above, the expert’s fast behavior is possible because the feature of the traffic sign 
given in the focus of attention is bound with a certain response in the same event file, the same representation for 
action. 
Dreyfus contends that the expert’s behavior does not arise from rule-following, not even from subpersonal ones. 
If the expert’s behavior were based on rule-following, it would be a reflex behavior (2002b, p. 419). By “reflex 
behavior” he means rigid and automatic behavior based on strict rules (when to press the pedal, when to turn sharply 
to the left etc.). This is in strong contrast with the flexible expert’s behavior. The expert’s behavior is always 
adapted to the current situation which is never perfectly alike to previously encountered situations. If he acted on 
rules, his behavior would collapse when the slightest change of the environmental conditions stipulated by those 
rules would occur. But there is no reason to think that the rules of action are that rigid. The rules may be flexible in 
the sense that they allow gaps where the agent can improvise (when the driver sees the sign “dangerous curve” he 
may push the brake pedal or he may reduce the gas pressure), or that the agent can combine strict behaviors with 
other spontaneous ones (the jazz player follows a chord and, while she is repeating it, she improvises progressively 
around it, modifies it etc.). In a study concerning the neural processes underpinning the acquisition of finger 
movement skills Ungerleider, Doyon and Karni (2002) have observed that acquiring a skill leads to the loss of 
representations of individual movements, but that a specific representation of the trained sequence of movements 
emerges. 
Dreyfus affirms that the expert does not reflect on what to do; he “feels drawn” to follow an action: “The 
embodied agent doesn’t think of doing what is solicited either. He just lets himself be drawn to lower a tension and 
straightway finds his body doing what feels appropriate, without needing to, or being able to, represent some desired 
goal.” (2002b, p. 420). In other places he describes this with the Merleau-Pontyian concept of “maximal grip”, The 
agent is so deeply immersed in that situation that he knows (or better, feels) which is the best form (or gestalt) of 
interaction with that situation. The agent is continuously looking to bring the interaction to that optimal grip. It is 
like you are sitting on an uncomfortable chair and keep moving until you reach the best position, though you 
couldn’t describe this position in advance. When you are in it, you just feel that it is the best position.  
228   Cristinel Ungureanu and Irina Rotaru /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  163 ( 2014 )  220 – 229 
The idea of optimal grip is based on the thesis that the skillful coper is an embodied agent, emotionally involved 
in continuously improving his actions. But the emotional involvement does not exclude subpersonal binding of 
descriptive and directive information in the same representation for action. To “feel drawn”, maybe 
phenomenologically plausible, it does not illuminate us in what consists the underlying processes. The thesis of 
representations for action suggests that, when you feel the drawn, it is because the feature of the situation is directly 
bound with a response. What is at the novice level explicit knowledge is for the expert sub-intentional know-how. If 
the action fails, the agent is able to access this knowledge and modify it. When Dreyfus says that “the agent does not 
think” (2002b, p. 420), he means, at the most, situations in which affordances of things are fully given in perception. 
Empirically, there are types of neurons within the anterior intraparietal area (AIP) which vibrate to the shape of 
objects when grasping them (cube, cylinder etc.); no other features activate these neurons (Sakata, Taira & Mine, 
1995). Even the AIP neurons do not work in isolation; they are connected to neurons from the ventral premotor 
cortex (Gentilucci et al., 1988), which are very selective for different kinds of grasps. For example, they cooperate 
during the contralateral shaping of the hand when performing reach-to-grasp movements (Fogassi et al., 2001). So, 
certain basic shapes may trigger a response without being necessary to bind visual information to motor command in 
a representation for action; the motor command is here a built-in property of the neurons processing visual 
information. But, for example, if I see a bike, the handle affords grasping, the seat sitting etc. To use the bike we 
have to resort to pre-existing knowledge (Borghi, 2005, p. 10-11). Buxbaum et al. (2003) show that apraxic patients 
are able to pair correct movements with new objects, but fail to do this with already known objects. Given that 
apraxic patients lack the capacity for building representations for action (see above), the patients studied by 
Buxbaum et al. do not have formed representations for action from the explicit knowledge about objects. Therefore, 
there are simple features that “solicit” actions without representational mediation and there are instruments that 
require binding of different kinds of information in the same representation. The lack of representations for action 
explain why apraxic patients are able to perform simple movements (like grasping, pushing etc.), but not to use 
instruments. 
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